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Calling the Tune: Domestic Workers' Earnings 
and Intra-Household Gender Relations 
in Turkey 
Gtil OZYEGIN 
"We [women] worked but never saw the face of money." This is how 
most of the rural migrant Turkish women I studied, who are employed as 
domestic workers in the middle-class homes of Ankara, expressed the 
absence of wages in their past lives as peasant women, when I asked them 
if they earned wages back in the village. Indeed, these women were char-
acterizing an important part of their lives as a transition from unpaid fam-
ily workers to urban, "individualized" wage earners. The basic patriarchal 
organization of the Turkish peasant family and its economic and social 
life allow women no direct control over money when women do not re-
ceive individual wages. Although female labor is central to the production 
process, this production system is characterized by the absence of 
autonomous female economic activity and independent female earnings 
(Sirman 1988; Berik 1987; Kandiyoti 1990). Furthermore, when women 
are employed as wage laborers their wages are negotiated by and paid to 
the head of the household, and, as a result, women have no control over 
cash flow. Now, as wage earners, these women have become major con-
tributors to their household economy. Does finally "seeing the face of 
money" affect these women's lives in terms of greater control over re-
sources and allow them participation in decision-making processes from 
which they were previously excluded? How and in what areas of life are 
women able to translate economic agency into decision-making authority? 
How do women feel about earning wages? What role, if any, does earning 
wages play in the alteration of their subjectivities? Does earning wages 
put them in circumstances to challenge patriarchal authority? 
In this paper, I investigate these questions comparatively as they per-
tain to the two groups of rural migrant women, who share similar migra-
tory histories and socio economic profiles. However, their different social 
locations in the urban space create differences in the dynamics involved in 
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women's ability to control their income and to translate income into deci-
sion-making influence. 
As many have demonstrated, women ' s earnings neither inevitably 
translate into their exercise of independent control over their money, nor 
automatically increase their decision-making authority in households 
(Safilios-Rothschild 1990; Standing 1985; Blumberg 1991; Blumstein and 
Schwartz 1991). There are many reasons for this. Women ' s subordinate 
position in the labor market rarely allows them to achieve wage and statu 
parity with men, rendering the relative size of women's monetary contri-
bution to the household economy smaller than men ' s. Inferior earnings 
provide women with low bargaining power inside the family , lending 
them no special leverage in household politics of redistributive practices. 
Gender and family ideologies naturalize and legitimize gendered relation-
ships to money and authority. 
In this paper, I build on these ideas of women ' s control over earned in-
come and their spending practices in my examination of Turkish domestic 
workers' experiences with their earnings. I probe two sets of interrelated 
dichotomies in the literature, subsistence/surplus spending and maternal 
altruism/self-interest, that inform main parameters of the discussion in 
assessing women's empowerment in relation to income earning. My aim 
is to posit an analysis of Turkish domestic workers' experiences that en-
compasses the interaction of these dichotomies. 
Research Context 
Turkey is a large increasingly modem and industrial nation with a popula-
tion exceeding 65 million, which has undergone social transformation so 
rapidly that it has been described as a society "on the brink of a social 
mutation" (Tekeli 1990, 3). One aspect of change is an ongoing urbaniza-
tion that is drawing the rural population into the big cities in a process one 
social scientist calls "depeasantization" (Kiray 1991 ). The impact of these 
social and economic transformations on women and gender relations is 
not uniform in Turkey. Migration of peasant women often results in their 
"housewifisation" (Senyapili 1981 b, 214). Most women, especially mar-
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ried women in rural migrant communities, are not allowed to work outside 
the home because of patriarchal opposition to women's employment, and, 
thus, they show the lowest urban female participation in wage labor 
(Ayata and Ayata 1996). Economic hardship in many migrant households 
does not erode deep-seated male objections to women's employment. 
Only 16.5 percent of the urban female population in metropolitan areas 
were employed in 1994. Recent studies conducted on women's informal 
occupations in urban settings suggest that the labor of migrant women is 
becoming increasingly informalized (Cinar 1991; White 1991). Women 
are confined to particular branches of the informal sector, concentrated in 
those activities that occur within the home and are compatible with their 
roles within the domestic sphere. Informal wage-earning activities rein-
force women's dependent status as wives and mothers rather than as in-
come earners. 
A recent national survey of the division of labor by gender in Turkish 
families reveals that housework and childcare are territories of work oc-
cupied solely by women. Women have sole responsibilty for household 
tasks and childcare. The only area of work that men share with women is 
grocery shopping. There is no significant difference between urban and 
rural families' pattern of gendered division of labor (KSSGM 1998, 50-
57). The most recent findings on some aspects of decision making indicate 
that routine household spending decisions are mostly made by women 
(Ozbay 1990) representing a shift from the male-dominant decision-
making profile found in the national survey of Turkish family structure in 
1968 (Timur 1972). And more importantly, controlling for such factors as 
social class and women's social status as employed wives or housewives, 
decisions pertaining to women's physical mobility, women's employment, 
birth control, and sex belonged to men indicating the pervasiveness of 
male domination in Turkish society. 
This Study 
This paper draws upon a larger study of two groups of rural migrant 
women now living in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. These rural migrant 
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women work in private homes as domestic workers, where the terms and 
conditions of their labor are neither officially determined nor regulated. I 
distinguish the two groups of women by the proximity of their homes to 
their work places. The first group of women I studied are the wives of 
doorkeepers of middle and upper-middle-class apartment buildings and I 
refer to this group (N=103) as wives of doorkeepers in this paper. Unlike 
the majority of rural migrants, doorkeeper (kapici in Turkish - literally 
means "doorkeeper") families live and work in middle and upper-class 
areas where husbands are employed as doorkeepers 1 and wives as domes-
tic workers. Doorkeeper families live in the basements of the buildings in 
which their services are required. Wives of doorkeepers constitute a prime 
pool from which middle-class tenants recruit waged domestic labor. Be-
cause of this, wives of doorkeepers rarely navigate the domestic labor 
market, but hold a virtual monopoly over domestic service. 
The second group (N=57) of domestic workers consists of those who 
live in squatter settlements in the margins of the city and commute daily 
to upper-middle-class neighborhoods for work. I refer to them as women 
of squatter settlement in this paper. The two groups experience urban 
space in quite different ways. While women of squatter settlement negoti-
ate the diverse contexts and dynamic pace of urban life, and the domestic 
labor market, wives of doorkeepers remain firmly attached to their apart-
ment houses. Wives of doorkeepers can undertake paid domestic work 
without leaving the home or the oversight of their husbands. Squatter 
women, however, are accustomed to long daily commutes across subcul-
tural and geographic boundaries Indeed, the latter embodies the con-
straints placed on female spatial mobility in Turkey. 
The comparison between wives of doorkeepers and squatter settlement 
women offers a vantage point for delineating the conditions under which 
women are able to retain control over their earnings. Both groups of 
women have undergone a radical transition from unpaid family laborers 
The doorkeepers' main duties include operating central-heating systems, performing 
maintenance duties, taking out the residents' trash, buying and distributing fresh bread 
twice a day, grocery shopping for the residents, providing building security, collecting 
monthly maintenance fees from tenants, and disposing of refuse from coal-burning 
furnaces. Duties may also include walking tenants' dogs, tending gardens, or taking 
tenants' children to school. The closest North American term for this job is "janitor" or 
"super", or the "concierge" in France, though none of these fully describe the Turkish 
doorkeepers' work and occupational identity. For a study of janitors in the United Sta-
tes during the 1950s, see Ray Gold (1952). 
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(as peasant women) to individual wage earners as domestic workers. The 
institution of doorkeeping perpetuates the familiar patriarchal structures, 
albeit in modified forms by enabling men to maintain their traditional 
control over women's labor and earnings. The imprecise boundaries be-
tween the locus of work and of home allows for the peripheral involve-
ment of household members other than the official jobholder, the door-
keeper husband. In contrast to squatter settlement women, doorkeeper 
wives retain the "unpaid family laborer" status from their rural past, de-
spite working as wage earners. The doorkeeper's job structurally rein-
states some of the terms of the peasant conjugal contract that defines men 
as absolute holders and managers of the earnings of those under their au-
thority and protection. Cash wages owed to the doorkeeper wives are oc-
casionally paid to husbands (just as they were in the village). Thus, in 
these cases, cash does not even find its way into women's hands, let alone 
enter into their pockets. 
With a few exceptions, the women in this study come to Ankara with 
no previous urban experience. During the time of my survey in 1990, the 
majority of these migrant women had lived in Ankara for a fairly long 
time, roughly eleven years on average. They range in age from 18.5 to 
66.0 years with a mean age of 33.2. The women in the squatter settlement 
group are, on average, 6.4 years older than the wives of doorkeepers. The 
mean age of marriage is 17.6 years for the doorkeeper group and 16.7 for 
the squatter settlement group. Length of employment in domestic service 
ranged from one month to 37.0 years with a mean of 7.7 years. Nearly 
half of the women are illiterate, and only 3 percent have as much as a 
middle school education. The two groups are similar in terms of number 
of years in primary school and literary rate. The two groups have similar 
household characteristics. Eighty-nine percent of the doorkeeper house-
holds and 81 percent of the squatter settlement households were nuclear. 
Though, the doorkeeper households were smaller, with an average of 4.3 
members compared with 5.3 members in squatter settlement household. 
Doorkeeper families have an average of 2.6 children living at home, while 
squatter families average 3 .1. 
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Method 
Three sources of field data: a survey, participant observation, and in-depth 
interviews provide the empirical foundation of my analysis. The fact that 
the majority of domestic workers in Turkey are wives of doorkeepers of-
fered a unique opportunity for drawing a representative sample. The 
apartment buildings that house this group of domestic workers and em-
ployers provided me with a frame for random sampling. I selected 103 
domestic workers in the doorkeeper group by using a mixed sampling 
strategy (systematic and random). In addition, I interviewed a total of 57 
domestic workers from four different squatter settlement neighborhoods. 
Due to the lack of an adequate sampling frame, though, a representative 
sampling procedure for this group was not possible. Instead, this group 
was chosen by a snowball method. The survey included forty questions 
probing issues related to domestic financial arrangements, ranging from 
sources of income in the household, income-pooling strategies, allocation 
of income into different spending categories to patterns of money control. 
In addition to these questions, the survey instrument contained questions 
pertaining to spending decisions in four areas: the purchase of food, the 
purchase of household durables, the purchase of electrical appliances, and 
the purchase of clothes for religious holidays. It also included one ques-
tion on how saved money was spent and two questions pertaining to the 
raising of their children. In addition, three questions were designed to 
explore decisions about both self and social life, including questions about 
birth control and sex ("when to have sexual intercourse"). Finally, the 
questionnaire included a question about who has the "last word" in impor-
tant family matters and its normative counterpart: who should have the 
word? The survey probed for open-ended responses to many questions, 
including "how they define/see the impact of earning wages on their mar-
riages". 
I and my two research assistants administered the survey through face-
to-face interviews. For another source of field data, I took part in many 
informal gatherings of women for drinking tea and chatting. I was also 
invited to circumcision and wedding ceremonies and to women's periodic 
"acceptance-day" (kabul gunu) gatherings. I spent a considerable amount 
of time in their homes, casually socializing, watching television and eating 
meals with them, their husbands and children, and their neighbors. I be-
came a constant presence in their communities. This status allowed for 
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considerable informality: participating in daily routines without setting-up 
particular meeting times and without radically interrupting the rhythm of 
work or leisure. For example, I assisted women as they folded laundry, 
prepared food, and bargained with the street peddlers. On a few occasions 
I accompanied them on visits to a doctor's office or to stores when they 
went into debt to purchase a set of steel cookware or fancy sheets. Quali-
tative data offers me interpretative lens for understanding the grounded 
complexities of the lives of these women. Although the doorkeeper sam-
ple is based on a representative sample, the snowball sample of squatter 
women limits the generalization of my findings. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
In the last three decades feminist scholars have made great progress in de-
naturalizing a household model which had been the hallmark of a diverse 
range of theories from the New Home Economics to Marxists economic 
and development theories. These theories identify the household as a shar-
ing and pooling unit without considering the relations of power that struc-
ture it. The concept of the moral economy of the household, common to 
these views, assumes that the internal economy of the household is gov-
erned by principles of reciprocity, consensus, solidarity and altruism 
(Wolf 1992; Folbre 1988; Berk 1985; Harris 1988 for criticism of the New 
Home Economics and Marxist models). According to this model, adaptive 
household strategies are "objectively" beneficial for all members of the 
domestic group. This model not only ignores differences of gender and 
age in family experiences, but also underestimates conflict and adversarial 
negotiations concerning money or distributional practices within the 
household (Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Hartmann 1981; Thorne and Yalom 
1982; Harris 1988; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). 
Indeed, a growing body of empirical research has shown that income 
and other financial resources are not always pooled and reallocated ac-
cording to the family's collective well being and resources such as food, 
education and health care are distributed unequally by gender and age in 
households (Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Hartmann 1981; Whitehead 1988; 
Maher 1988; Hoodfar 1988; Fapohunda 1988; Mencher 1988; Charles and 
Kerr 1987). There are also important differences in the ways men and 
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women spend household earnings under their control. Women devote 
more of their incomes than men to subsistence and nutrition, while men 
withhold their earnings for individual spending (Whitehead 1988; Maher 
1988; Bolak 1995; Delphy 1979; Pahl 1980; Wilson 1987; Dwyer and 
Bruce 1988; Kiray 1985; Celle de Bowman 2000). White (1981) describes 
women's close attachment to the collective or family aspects of consump-
tion as reflecting "maternal altruism", a powerful ideology that effectively 
creates barriers to women disposing of their income freely in the market. 
Blumberg' s (1991) cross-cultural studies show that wives' incomes af-
fect their power only to the extent that they retain control over that in-
come. Patriarchal organization of gender relations assign women as wives 
and daughters no authority in allocation and distribution of their earnings, 
which are often regulated and controlled by the male head of household. 
Thus, limiting the role of earned income in making differences in their 
own lives. Blumberg further argues that women's empowerment is espe-
cially limited in low-income households where women, even when they 
have full control over money, cannot translate their income into increased 
power for themselves because subsistence incomes allow for little discre-
tionary spending (Safilios-Rothschild 1990; Standing 1985; Blumberg 
1991; Blumstein and Schwartz 1991 ). 
In this chapter, I attempt to empirically probe these two dichotomies; 
one that delineates sharply spending for subsistence and surplus and the 
one that casts women as maternal altruists and men as self-interested and 
individuated actors. Subsistence and surplus level spending are neither 
empirically tangible given nor universally applicable categories. Meanings 
of "subsistence" and "surplus" are not only culturally defined but also 
shift depending on the income level and social class. Similarly, the di-
chotomy that casts women as maternal altruists and men as self-interested 
and individuated actors needs to be empirically specified within the nor-
mative context of gender order in a given society. I argue that this di-
chotomous framework bypasses the importance of women's consumption 
decisions in defining female identity. My analysis will suggest that the 
boundaries between the maternal altruism and self-interest in Turkish 
migrant women's lives are permeable. 
In what follows I first examine allocation of women's income in the 
household and distinguish the main money control patterns, discussing 
women's experience in money control in relation to the levels of women's 
contribution to the household economy. I then examine strategies women 
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employ to create conditions in which they can autonomously dispose of 
portions of their income. Here, scrutinizing the distinction between subsis-
tence and surplus spending, I address the crucial question of what women 
do with money at their disposal and suggest, as alternative to maternal 
altruism and subsistence/surplus explanations, a different way of looking 
at the worth of women's and men's personal spending money. Finally, I 
examine women's perception of decision making according to women's 
different contributor status and money control systems. 
Findings and Analysis 
"The Money That Comes In Daily, Goes Out Daily": Allocation of Women's In-
come 
A pattern of gender-specific purchasing, where husband's and wife's in-
comes are channeled into different spending categories, characterizes 
most of the households' spending practices in this study. Nearly 40 per-
cent of the women in the doorkeeper sample reported that their earnings 
go toward specific expenditures, primarily for food but also including 
clothing, household durable goods, children's education, and their daugh-
ters' trousseau. In the squatter settlement group, a much higher percentage 
of women (78 percent) reported that their income paid for subsistence and 
nutrition, primarily for kitchen expenses. 
Meanings attached to husbands' and wives' financial contributions and 
the devolution of their incomes to specific expenditures are related to dif-
ferences in the ways in which husbands' and wives' earnings enter the 
household, reflecting differences in the frequency of payment for women 
and men. In these households, women receive their wages daily, whereas 
men receive their cash wages monthly. Thus, there is a built-in tendency 
to spend women's wages on food and other daily expenditures and men's 
wages on fixed expenditures that require monthly payments, such as in-
stallments for consumer goods and other monthly bills (rent, utilities, 
phone, etc.) Many women noted that "The money that comes in daily, 
goes out daily". But this expression is more readily translated into practice 
326 Gui Ozyegin 
for women in the squatter settlement group who, on the way home from 
work, spend a great proportion of their daily wages on food shopping. 
Yet this clear-cut channeling of women's earnings into gender-specific 
spending areas does not always mean that women control spending in 
these areas. Even when women's earnings are earmarked for particular 
kinds of expenditures, they are consolidated in a "common pot", which is 
often controlled by the husband. With the exception of a small number of 
cases (N=8) in the squatter settlement group where ~nly "abstract" pool-
ing is present, as far as the members of the nuclear family are concerned, 
all households in this study pool their income and other financial re-
sources. 2 Nonetheless, the control of money, rather than the presence of 
pooling, is a crucial factor that allows us to assess the relations between 
power and income for women. 
Women's Level of Contribution and Control of Money 
In order to compare the control women have over the disposal and distri-
bution of their incomes at different contribution levels, I subdivided the 
sample into three groups according to the relative size of women's contri-
bution to household income. Women whose contribution is equal to or 
higher than 60 percent of the total household income are classified as 
"major" contributors; those who contribute 40 to 60 percent are classified 
as "equal"; and those who made up less than 40 percent of the total in-
come are categorized as "minor." 
In the doorkeeper group, the proportions of major, equal and minor 
contributors are 44.1 percent, 38.2 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively, 
2 Perhaps, as argued by Fapohunda (1988), having knowledge of a spouse's income, 
knowing where that income is spent and the existence of joint financial planning are 
good measures of existence of pooling. According to this criterion, households in my 
study are pooling-households. First, the majority of women had full knowledge of their 
husbands' income (at least the stable part of it). In cases where they did not, this was 
more an effect of the unpredictability of the informal petty cash earning activities than 
an instrument of intra-household power or separation of budgets. Second, they had full 
knowledge of how their husbands spent their money. Third, as explained in this para-
graph, they had an understanding that each spouse' s income would go to particular 
items of spending and investment - regardless of who controlled the money and who 
had decision-making power. 
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which means that the overwhelming majority of women are the main 
source of household income (Table 1). In the squatter group, 13.7 percent 
of women are major contributors, 49.0 percent are equal contributors and 
37.3 percent are minor contributors. 
Do different proportions of male and female contributions produce dif-
ferences in control and redistribution within the household? Control signi-
fies a capacity to enforce direction and disposal of money against compet-
ing claims. Control over money is a difficult concept to measure, because 
the important distinction between "execution of money" (management 
and/or budgeting) and "control" often gets blurred. Pahl (1983) analyti-
cally distinguishes between "control" that concerns major intra-household 
decisions of a "policy-making" kind and "management" that puts policy 
decisions into action. The concept of control as I use it here covers both 
the senses of "policy-making" and "management". 
Table I. Women's level of contribution to the household income 
Doorkeeper Squatter 
% N % N 
Major contributor 44.1 45 13.7 7 
Equal contributor 38.2 39 49.0 25 
Minor contributor 17.6 18 37.3 19 
Total 100.0 102 100.0 51 
Table 2. Control of money 
Doorkeeper Squatter 
% N % N 
Male control 61.8 63 37.3 19 
Female control 17.6 18 37.3 19 
Shared control 20.6 21 9.8 5 
Separate n.a. 15.7 8 
Total 100.0 102 100.0 51 
Two items from the survey instrument produced a four-part categoriza-
tion. The following have been used in assigning each woman to a specific 
control category: 1) who physically holds the household money - the 
wife, husband or neither (neither holds but there is a designated place 
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where money is kept), and 2) who manages the household money. The 
four categories developed from these two variables are "Male control", 
"Female control", "Shared control", and "Separate control" (Table 2). 
Under Male control system, household money is held and administered 
by the husband. It basically takes two forms. In the first the husband holds 
and manages the money, and the wife rarely deals with money after hand-
ing over her wages. Alternatively, the husband controls the money but 
delegates the daily management of a portion of it to the wife in the form 
of partial housekeeping allowance. In the majority of doorkeeper house-
holds, money is under male control (62 percent). In the squatter settlement 
group, male and female control are equally distributed (37 percent). It is 
only among minor contributors that I found the second variant of the 
male-control system, the partial housekeeping allowance system. 
If the husband's and wife's earnings are combined and she manages 
the money, either held by her or kept in a place where she has exclusive 
access, it is defined Female control system. This system is more prevalent 
in the squatter settlement households. Shared control system presents a 
pattern of joint conjugal financial control and management where the 
money is either held by the woman or is kept in a designated place to 
which both the husband and the wife have access. Shared control is the 
second prevalent mode among the doorkeeper households (21 percent), 
while its proportion is the smallest in the squatter group (10 percent). 
In Separate control system each spouse holds and manages his or her 
own money. Physical pooling does not take place. A gender-specific divi-
sion of responsibilities for expenditures constitutes one of the bases for 
the separately controlled system. While women's and men's incomes are 
allocated to gender-specific expenditures across the sample as I explained 
earlier, within the separate control system women and men assume control 
of gender-specific spending. Each spouse keeps his/her own earnings 
separately; they control and manage them separately - what Pahl (1983) 
calls the "independent management system". I found this system only in 
the squatter households (16 percent). 
One would expect women who are major contributors to the total 
household income to maintain control of financial resources. That is, ma-
jor contributors would be the least represented under the male-controlled 
money system. This expectation is confirmed in the case of the squatter 
group in which 57 percent of households where women are major con-
tributors are female-controlled. As the women's contribution increases, 
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the proportion of squatter settlement households with money under male 
control decreases and those under female control increases (Table 3). 
Table 3. Level of contribution by type of control over money 
Doorkeeper Group Squatter Group 
Major Equal Minor Total Major Equal Minor Total 
Male 64.4 53.9 72.2 61.8 14.3 32.00 52.6 37.3 
Female 20.0 15.4 16.7 17.7 57.1 36.00 31.6 37.3 
Shared 15.6 30.8 11.1 20.6 0.00 16.00 5.3 9.8 
Separate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 28.6 16.00 10.5 15.7 
Total 45 39 18 102 7 25 19 51 
However, in the case of the doorkeeper group, no linear relationship is 
apparent between who controls the money and the level of women's con-
tribution. Instead, the relationship appears to be hyperbolic. While nearly 
three quarters of the minor contributors are under male control, a much 
smaller proportion of major or equal contributors are under male control. 
Yet, the proportion of equal contributors under male control is smaller 
(54 percent) than that of the major contributors (64 percent) under the 
same type of control. 
The overall proportion of doorkeeper households under female control 
is not very large either. While 82 percent of doorkeeper wives are either 
major or equal contributors, only 15 percent of these households are under 
female control. Indeed, incidence of female control is relatively uniform 
despite differences in contribution levels. 
In the doorkeeper group, then, the type of control and the size of con-
tribution are relatively independent factors while the two are closely cor-
related in the squatter group. This striking difference results from the 
doorkeeper husband's job, which allows him to exert substantial control 
over household money. His home-bound and shopping-centered work 
informs the internal structure of the household economy, constraining 
women's control over their earnings. Wives interpret their limited rela-
tionship with money in terms of a traditional conjugal contract that de-
fines men as leaders of the household. In the modem form of this tradi-
tional idea, they believe that the husband's job places him in an 
objectively privileged position to decide what is needed in the household 
and how it can be obtained. 
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Comparable "Worth" of Women's and Men 's Personal Spending 
The degree to which women can claim any part of their earnings for them-
selves or for discretionary purposes varies. Three groups emerged: "non-
claimers", "known-claimers", and "clandestine claimers". Thirty percent 
of the doorkeeper wives and 57 percent of the squatter women set aside 
some portion of their income as money under their exclusive control. The 
frequency and the amount set aside vary considerably in both groups. 
Some regularly reserve a portion of their daily wages while others with-
hold money as they need it. About a quarter of women in the doorkeeper 
group and a third in the squatter settlement group are "clandestine claim-
ers" who set aside money without the knowledge of their husbands. 
In both the doorkeeper and squatter groups, a strong relationship exists 
between male control of household money and women setting aside 
money for discretionary use. There is, however, a difference in the rela-
tion between control type and clandestine withholding in the two groups. 
In the doorkeeper group, eight of the nine clandestine claimers are in the 
"money under male control" group. In the squatter group, clandestine 
claimers are evenly distributed across types of control. 
Men also claim personal spending money, with nearly 20 percent of 
doorkeeper husbands and 52 percent of squatter settlement men withhold-
ing some portion of their income. A larger percentage of doorkeeper hus-
bands do not hold back money for two reasons. First, the majority of these 
husbands have exclusive access to the household money. When asked 
whether their husbands set aside money for their personal use, these wives 
said "all money is his money". When money is under his control, the 
doorkeeper, as well as the squatter settlement husband, can spend it for 
personal use without designating it as "his set-aside money". The same 
explanation may apply to women whose set-aside money becomes more 
visible when men control all household money. Second, since the door-
keeper works inside the apartment and its vicinity, he has less work-
related expenses requiring personal spending money. In contrast, among 
the squatter group, where men work away from home, a much higher pro-
portion keep personal spending money regardless of the type of control in 
the household. Both groups' percentages of set aside-money still fall be-
low those of women's. Interestingly, the direct relationship between set-
ting aside spending money and men's control observed among women is 
more strongly mirrored among husbands. More men in the households 
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where money is under female control appear to keep personal spending 
money than in households where men control money themselves. 
Men's personal money is spent on cigarettes, work-related expenses 
(transportation) and routine socializing activities such as trips to coffee 
houses, the modal "recreational" activity among lower class Turkish men. 
Men's personal spending patterns cause no conflict unless they are mark-
edly irresponsible (husbands with gambling and drinking problems.) In-
deed, women believe a man should not go around without any cash in his 
pocket - for, as I will discuss below, day-to-day male-gendered routines 
require more visible personal cash. 
Women's "personal" spending money is usually channeled into collec-
tive and non-personal expenditures. A great proportion of women spend 
their discretionary funds on children's education and clothing ( 61 percent 
in the doorkeeper and 34 percent in the squatter group). Such expenses 
might include sending children to kurs (private courses outside the school 
system) or to extra-curricular courses (for instance a mother from the 
doorkeeper group sends her artistically gifted 11 year old daughter to an 
art class) and providing children their daily allowance for school. 
Many women also invest discretionary money in golden bangles and 
gold coins which serve as security and savings. Although women use 
golden bangles and chains as ornaments to display wealth and self-worth, 
these goods also serve as savings for the well-being and security of the 
family. Such jewelry is converted into money when an urgent need arises. 
However, the moment of conversion occurs most typically when a big 
sum of cash is needed for property investments (house and land) or when 
the family marries off a son. Savings in the form of collecting gold brace-
lets and coins also frequently functions as an informal banking and loan 
mechanism in the women's community, where women borrow and pay 
back gold instead of cash. Women open credit accounts in neighborhood 
stores to buy items to beautify their homes such as drapes, tablecloths, 
towels, blankets, expensive steel pot sets, fancy tea pots and sets of coffee 
cups to be displayed in glass cabinets. Women also spend discretionary 
money on sheets, comforters and similar items as well as on material to 
make embroidered household items for a daughter's trousseau. 
As described thus far, these patterns of discretionary spending and 
what women's income pays for are fully consistent with other cross cul-
tural findings: women devote their income to subsistence and nutrition 
and they tend to closely identify their discretionary spending interests with 
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home and children (Whitehead 1988; Maher 1988; Delphy 1979; Pahl 
1980; Wilson 1987; Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Kiray 1985). Should we, 
then, conclude that Turkish migrant women's altruistic behavior benefits 
their families and children at the expense of their own autonomy and em-
powerment? 
I suggest that we should not automatically assume that "maternal altru-
ism" necessarily entails negative consequences for women. We should, 
instead, empirically demonstrate the actual meanings and consequences of 
"maternal altruism". Accepting the proposition that women do not benefit 
from their earnings because of their maternal altruism risks ignoring cul-
tural meanings of such spending and the ways it defines identity. Even 
though women in this study channel their earnings into home and chil-
dren-centered spending categories, like their counterparts in similar con-
texts, they often cherish independent access to and control of money, even 
for apparently "subsistence" level spending because their consumption 
decisions enhance their status as mothers and housewives. Spending cate-
gories that are closely associated with these women's aspirations for mod-
ernity and urbanity, for example, stews - which can be made with or 
without meat - are an important part of the Turkish diet. Some women 
interviewed felt they had provided something out of the ordinary for their 
children when they were able to add meat to such dishes. Clearly, in these 
women's lives, adding meat is a "surplus" level act. These women rarely 
worry about their ability to feed hungry children. Instead, they wonder if 
they can bring them bananas (the most expensive fruit in Turkey), buy 
their family kabob from the comer kabob shop, or serve their guests pas-
try from the bakery rather than homemade cookies. 
The conceptual framework that proposes that women do not gain 
power from discretionary spending unless, like men, they spend on them-
selves is workable only in circumstances where men and women partici-
pate in the same sphere of activities (especially leisure consumption). We 
need to qualify such assumptions to express cultural contexts where 
women's social identity depends upon their role in the family and where 
there is a generalized gender segregation, such that equal gender spheres 
cannot be presupposed. 
What happens when the activities that women and men engage in and 
the possible terrains of sociability are gender-segregated? By borrowing 
the notion of "comparable worth" from the wage-equity movement 
(Steinberg and Haignere 1991), we can assume a comparable worth of 
Domestic Workers' Earnings and Intra-Household Gender Relations 333 
women's and men's personal expenditures even when women do not 
spend their "personal money" on items and leisure activities that are 
deemed to be personal. Although men and women operate within partially 
divergent gender domains with distinct conceptions of value and prestige, 
they may perceive themselves as gaining "comparable" degrees of status 
and self-esteem from different forms of spending. 
Thus, maternal altruism may be a highly feasible form of investment in 
a cultural sphere with good returns of fulfillment and social recognition. 
As rational and self-interested actors, these women devote their "per-
sonal" money to home and children-centered spending categories to en-
hance their status as wives and reputations as good mothers. Seemingly 
private, altruistic spending can be experienced as enhancing the status and 
self-image of the spender. To deny the benefits derived from "altruism" 
spending disregards women's agency and empowerment and belies their 
own perceptions of their lives and decisions. 
What I am suggesting is that the "worth" of a wife's entertaining her 
friends by baking chocolate cake (plain cake has a rural, unprestigious 
identity), serving instant coffee (a prestige item in the Turkish context) 
rather than cheaper traditional coffee, along with cubed sugar over the less 
expensive loose sugar because it signifies urban, modern refinement or 
sending her daughter to an art class are comparable in status value to her 
husband's treating his friends with coffee in the coffee-house or smoking 
high-priced imported Malboros rather than Turkish cigarettes. 
Moreover, intra-gender competition is not an exclusively male phe-
nomenon as is often assumed in the literature. Women compete among 
themselves for recognition and identity within their gender sphere - and, 
in financial terms, such competition can be just as costly as men's if not 
more so. Women are judged, gain worth, judge themselves, and find ful-
fillment according to culturally established standards of womanhood. 
Women's Influence in Household Decision Making 
How do women perceive decision making within the household? On the 
whole, doorkeeper wives seem to have a more limited influence in house-
hold spending decisions in all categories than the wives in the squatter 
settlement group, a discrepancy reflecting their different positions in the 
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money control systems discussed earlier. Yet their decision-making pro-
files are almost identical in the areas of decisions concerning self, sex, and 
overall decision making. 
As I described earlier, the survey instrument contained questions per-
taining to decisions in four areas of spending as well as one question on 
how saved money was spent. There were two questions pertaining to the 
raising of their children. Three questions were designed to explore deci-
sions about both self and social life, including questions about birth con-
trol and sex (when to have sexual intercourse). Finally, the questionnaire 
included a question about who has the "last word" in important family 
matters and its normative counterpart: who should have the word? For 
each decision, the respondent was asked to state which of the following 
choices best described the household arrangement: 1) "I have all"; 2) "I 
have more than him"; 3) "Equal"; 4) "He has more than me"; and 5) "He 
has all". Table 4 presents resulting total scores for the doorkeeper and 
squatter groups based on a summary ratio index.3 Women in both door-
keeper and squatter households claim to have a pronounced influence on 
3 In order to quantify the claimed relative weight of women's versus men 's decisions in 
such matters I developed a summary ratio index. Decisions were defined as husband 
dominant when respondents answered 4 or 5, female dominant when respondents an-
swered 1 and 2, and equal when respondents answered 3. The ratio index involved the 
sum of all female dominant decisions plus 1/2 of equal decisions divided by male 
dominant decisions. The formula can be represented as follows: 
1 + 2 + (halfof3) 
Decision Influence Ratio =-------
4 + 5 + (half of 3) 
The result is a ratio whose size shows the relative aggregate reported influence of the 
wife over that of the husband within any specified group in the sample. A score of 1.00 
indicates "equal influence"; scores less than 1.00 indicates less influence than men, 
and scores over 1.00 indicate higher influence than men. Obviously, this ratio does not 
lend itself to a literal, naturalistic interpretation. Instead, it should be taken as a con-
ceptually defensible measure of women's claimed influence in decision making. The 
justification for inclusion of the reported mid-point (i.e. "equal influence") in such a 
ratio is in the substantial social meaning of these women reporting an "equal influ-
ence" with their men. Since the women in my sample belong to a culture that is thor-
oughly patriarchal, it would be highly misleading to underestimate the weight of the 
"mid-point". Reporting to have an "equal say" in certain items may signal a claim to 
have very un-patriarchal powers in the family, and this measure is designed to capture 
that possibility. 
Domestic Workers' Earnings and Intra-Household Gender Relations 335 
purchasing and savings decisions .4 While the fact that most figures are 
below 1.00, therefore indicating less influence than men, the results for 
certain items in this survey are striking, for they suggest a level of 
women's influence that is markedly different from conclusions reached in 
other studies on decision-making profiles of Turkish families. It is also 
important to emphasize that the wife ' s increased participation in decision 
making is really an index of shared decision making rather than evidence 
of autonomous decision making. 
Women generally claim to have more influence on purchases that di-
rectly benefit them, including household technology that would reduce 
their work load, than they do on purchases related to electronic gadgets, a 
male domain. Women have less say in deciding how much to spend on 
food than men, even though a greater proportion of women's earnings go 
toward food-related expenses. This finding is not unexpected in the con-
text of the income control patterns of these households, but it does deviate 
from the more general cross-cultural pattern found in similar contexts 
where women have predominant or exclusive influence. The score on this 
item for the doorkeeper group is smaller than that of the squatter group, 
indicating the significant role of the doorkeeper husbands as agents of 
food-related purchases. 
Besides purchasing decisions, women in the doorkeeper group also 
have markedly less influence than men in decisions concerning expenses 
associated with children's education and how to bring them up (0.67 and 
0.86 respectively). A substantial difference in this area of influence be-
tween women in the doorkeeper and in the squatter households is also 
evident. Squatter settlement women claim to have more influence than 
their husbands in making decisions concerning children (1.08 and 1.15), 
reflecting again the sharing of childcare responsibilities by the doorkeeper 
husbands and the virtual absence of such involvement in the squatter 
group. In both groups, husbands have considerable influence over whom 
their wives may associate with. Although the score which reflects 
women's influence on choice of associates is very high for both groups, 
the size of the score for this item should not be considered comparable in 
4 Furthermore, Elliott and Moskoff (1983) found that the responses in their sample to 
similar family decision items clustered on the mid-point, decreasing the real variation 
which they believe that there was. My formula, by dispersing the mid-point toward the 
extremes, also takes care of this problem - albeit with a considerable fiat of mathe-
matical aesthetics. 
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size to the scores of any other decision-making items. In the doorkeeper 
group, for example, 50 percent of the women report having the say on this 
matter, 19 percent report having equal say with the husbands, and 31 per-
cent report that the husband decides with whom she may associate. Corre-
sponding percentages for the squatter group are 57.4 and 39, respectively. 
The fact that husbands are involved at all (as "equal" or "more" influen-
tial) in such directly personal decisions at such high proportions is indica-
tive of the extent of patriarchal control of women's social interactions in 
these families. 
Birth control is the only area of decision making in which husbands do 
not have any predominant or exclusive influence. Questions pertaining to 
birth control were asked only of those respondents who reported practic-
ing birth control in response to a previous question; therefore, these 
scores, apply to a subset of a sample and should be interpreted with cau-
tion. If and when a "decision" on the birth control is present, women are 
the predominant decision makers in this domain (1.97 for the doorkeeper 
group and 6.20 for the squatter settlement group). In the doorkeeper 
group, 31 of the 46 women who use birth control (mean age 30.3) re-
ported that it was a joint decision whereas 15 women (mean age 31.1) 
stated that it was exclusively their decision. In contrast, 13 women (mean 
age 35.1) out of 18 (those who use birth control) in the squatter settlement 
group reported that using birth control was their own decision, and 5 
women (mean age 33.4) said that this decision was made jointly with the 
husband. Women seem to have less influence on the decision of when and 
how frequently to have sex. The ratios are almost identical for both groups 
(0.20 for the doorkeeper group and 0.16 for the squatter group) . 
The ratios on "overall decision making" indicate that the last word be-
longs to the husband (0.13 in both groups and constitutes the lowest ratio). 
This response is consistent with my analysis of men's influence on 
"woman's association". This unspecific item contrasts well with a ques-
tion that frames the same issue with a normative orientation, "Who do you 
think should have the final say about important decisions affecting the 
family?". While only 22 percent of the wives of doorkeepers and 12 per-
cent of the women in the squatter group report having equal or more in-
fluence on important matters that affect the family, 65 percent and 55 
percent of the women uphold the normative view that women ought to 
have equal or more influence. 
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Table 4. Women' s influence in decision making. 
Doorkeeper and squatter. Totals 
Doorkeeper N* %** Squatter N* %** 
Consumption & saving decisions 
Food 0.64 81 79.41 0.82 30 58.82 
Household electronics 0.45 102 100.00 0.65 43 84.31 
Household durables 0.74 102 100.00 0.87 44 86.27 
Clothing 1.36 99 97.06 1.59 44 86.27 
Children's education 0.67 76 74.51 1.08 26 50.98 
Savings & investment 0.45 95 93.14 0.61 45 88.24 
Marital & self-related decisions 
How to raise children 0.86 96 94.12 1.15 44 86.27 
Birth control 1.97 46 45.10 6.20 18 35.29 
Woman's association 1.46 102 100.00 1.45 49 96.08 
When to have sex 0.20 97 95.IO 0.16 39 76.47 
Who has the "Last Word " and Who 
should have it 
Who has the last word on important 0.13 102 100.00 0.13 49 96.08 
family matters 
Who should have the last word 0.55 102 100.00 0.44 49 96.08 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
Do Women's Higher Earnings Translate into Greater Power? 
How do women's earnings and control of money affect decision making 
for the doorkeeper and the squatter groups? As Table 5 shows, in the 
doorkeeper households, a positive relationship occurs between the level of 
women's contribution to the household income and their influence in de-
cision making in the spending areas, indicating that major and equal con-
tributors have more influence than minor contributors. Across the board, 
major and equal contributors have more influence than their minor coun-
terparts, except in the case of household electronics. The most notable 
observation, however, is the existence of a small marked difference be-
tween "major" and "equal" contributors - being a major contributor does 
not immediately entail having more influence than an "equal" contributor. 
As shown in Table 6, in the squatter settlement households, major con-
tributors tend to participate in purchasing decisions to a greater extent 
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than minor contributors. With the exception of decisions concerning food 
and savings, equal contributors have more say than minors. The difference 
is especially marked in the area of self, sex, children's education, and 
clothing purchases. Child raising is the only area in which there is a re-
verse relationship between the level of contribution and decision making. 
In the doorkeeper group, control of money is closely related to deci-
sion-making power, and generally speaking, women who belong to hou-
seholds where money is under their control have a greater influence in all 
decision-making areas than women who are in households where money 
is under male control. This difference is especially pronounced in deci-
sions concerning food and children. Parallel observations can be also 
made in the case of the squatter settlement group, where a strong associa-
tion exists between women's greater control of money and their greater 
influence in decision making in all areas 
Table 5. Women's influence in decision making by the proportion 
of female monetary contribution to household in doorkeeper group 
MAJOR N* %** EQUAL N* %** MINOR N* %** 
Consumption & 
saving decisions 
Food 0.63 31 68.89 0.83 33 84.62 0.36 17 94.44 
Household electron- 0.38 45 100.00 0.56 39 100.00 0.38 18 100.00 
ics 
Household durables 0.70 45 100.00 1.00 39 100.00 0.44 18 100.00 
Clothing 1.67 44 97.78 1.39 37 94.87 0.80 18 100.00 
Children's education 0.68 32 71.11 0.75 28 71.79 0.52 16 88.89 
Savings & investment 0.5/ 40 88.89 0.6/ 37 94.87 0.13 18 100.00 
Marital & self-related 
decisions 
How to raise children 1.15 44 97.78 0.75 35 89.74 0.55 17 94.44 
Birth control 1.94 25 55.56 2.09 17 43.59 1.67 4 22.22 
Woman's association 2.00 45 100.00 1.36 39 100.00 0.80 18 100.00 
When to have sex 0.28 41 91.11 0./6 39 100.00 0./3 17 94.44 
Who has the "Last 
Word" and Who 
should have it 
Who has the last 0.15 45 100.00 0.15 39 100.00 0.06 18 100.00 
word on important 
family matters 
Who should have it 0.53 45 100.00 0.63 39 100.00 0.44 18 100.00 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
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Point of Saturation 
The preceding observations suggest that women's agency as decision 
makers is based on their control and disposal of their earnings. Comparing 
higher contributors with minor contributors, we clearly see the influence 
of earning power on decision making. However, this relationship does not 
seem linear: "major" contributors (i.e. those who contribute over 60 per-
cent of total household income) have less, not more, influence than equal 
contributors (i.e. those who contribute between 40 to 60 percent of total 
household income). Like those discussed earlier, this finding is consistent 
with the non-linearity (curvilinear) of the relationship between contribu-
tion level and male or female control of money. Just as the size of 
women's contributions does not ensure them control over money, contri-
bution size does not automatically translate into a proportionately in-
creased influence in household and self-related decisions. The "major" 
contributors who are under either female or shared control are clearly 
more influential in most decision areas than the corresponding groups 
among the "equal" contributors. 
The intriguing fact is that the women who make a "major" contribution 
but whose money is controlled by men are worse off than the correspond-
ing group of women who make only an "equal" contribution. 
How then do we explain this predominance of male control arrange-
ments under conditions where women are the major contributors? It is 
possible to conclude that wives' earnings generate increased decision-
making influence as long as those earnings are subordinate or equal to 
husbands' eamings.5 When women's earnings surpass those of their hus-
bands, men appear to exercise increased control in decision making. The 
threat entailed by women's economic power is countered by an increased 
exercise of patriarchal prerogative. 
5 This finding is consistent with Safilios-Rothchild's (1990) observations in the cases of 
Greece, Honduras, Kenya. 
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Table 6. Women's influence in decision making by the proportion 
of female monetary contribution to household in squatter group 
MAJOR N* %** EQUAL N* %** MINOR N * %** 
Consumption & 
saving decisions 
Food 3.00 4 57.14 0.65 14 56.00 0.71 12 63.16 
Household electron- 0.71 6 85.71 0.78 24 96.00 0.44 13 68.42 
ics 
Household durables 1.40 6 85.71 1.00 24 96.00 0.56 14 73.68 
Clothing 1.40 6 85.71 3.00 22 88.00 0.78 16 84.21 
Children's education 2.00 6 85.71 1.44 ll 44.00 0.50 9 47.37 
Savings & investment 1.00 6 85.71 0.50 21 84.00 0.64 18 94.74 
Marital & self-related 
decisions 
How to raise children 2.00 6 85.71 0.90 20 80.00 1.25 18 94.74 
Birth control 5.00 3 42.86 8.00 9 36.00 5.00 6 31.58 
Woman's association 0.71 6 85.71 2.43 24 96.00 1.00 19 100.00 
When to have sex 0.00 5 71.43 0.31 19 76.00 0.07 15 78.95 
Who has the "Last 
Word " and Who 
should have it 
Who has the last 0.50 6 85.71 0.07 24 96.00 0.12 19 100.00 
word on important 
family matters 
Who should have it 0.40 7 100.00 0.39 23 92.00 0.52 19 100.00 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
Conversely, women under such conditions do not seem to seek to increase 
their influence commensurately with their earnings, perhaps because con-
tinued gains involve different kinds of costs for women and result in in-
creasing marital conflicts. Women, therefore, may be more likely to avoid 
using their superior earning power as leverage for intra-household bar-
gaining once they clearly become the dominant income providers. There 
seems to be a threshold, a saturation point, beyond which women cannot -
or imagine they cannot - proceed. 
The data clearly underscore the extent to which men reassert male con-
trol of female income once that income clearly surpasses their own. Inter-
views with domestic workers further illuminate women's attempts to 
change the dynamics of their marriages with money and male response to 
such an attempt. 
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Table 7. Women' s influence in decision making by "control of money" 
in doorkeeper group 
Men N* %** Women N* %** Shared N* %** 
Consumption & 
saving decisions 
Food 0.42 47 74.60 2.09 17 94.44 0.55 17 80.95 
Household electron- 0.34 63 100.00 0.64 18 100.00 0.68 21 100.00 
ics 
Household durables 0.70 63 100.00 0.57 18 100.00 1.10 21 100.00 
Clothing 1.26 60 95.24 1.77 18 100.00 1.33 21 100.00 
Children's education 0.58 49 77.78 0.86 13 72.22 0.87 14 66.67 
Savings & investment 0.39 59 93.65 0.68 16 88.89 0.48 20 95.24 
Marital & self-related 
decisions 
How to raise children 0.64 60 95.24 1.62 17 94.44 1.24 19 90.48 
Birth control 1.84 27 42.86 3.00 6 33.33 1.89 13 61.90 
Woman's association 1.47 63 100.00 2.00 18 100.00 I.JO 21 100.00 
When to have sex 0.14 58 92.06 0.38 18 100.00 0.27 21 100.00 
Who has the "Last 
Word" and Who 
should have it 
Who has the last 0.09 63 100.00 0.29 18 100.00 0.17 21 100.00 
word on important 
family matters 
Who should have it 0.47 63 100.00 0.71 18 100.00 0.68 21 100.00 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
Zebra Kibar (a pseudonym), wife of a doorkeeper, described a Sunday 
afternoon when she and her husband took their two children, an 8 year old 
girl and a 10 year old boy, to the amusement park (Genclik Parki). At the 
beginning of this outing, the boy misbehaved - did something that made 
his sister cry. The father decided to punish the boy on the spot: first he 
lightly smacked him and then declared that the boy would not get the ice-
cream he was promised and was eagerly anticipating. Zehra intervened, 
turning to her husband and saying "the boy is going to get his ice-cream. 
I'll pay for it. In fact, my money is paying for this whole outing". Amari-
tal argument ensued and continued at home; the husband accused her of 
using her money to undermine his authority. "Who do you think you are?" 
he asked. The boy did not get his ice-cream: Zehra could not act in direct 
defiance of her husband's wishes. Her defiance of his will was limited to 
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the mere assertion of a disposal right. Going further than that by actually 
buying the ice-cream would be costly. 
Table 8. Women's influence in decision making by "control of money" 
in the squatter group 
Men N* %** Women N* %** Shared N* %** Separate N* %** 
Consumption & 
saving decisions 
Food 0.24 13 68.42 3.40 11 57.89 0.00 1 20.00 1.00 5 62.50 
Household elec- 0.20 15 78.95 1.25 18 94.74 0.67 5 100.00 1.00 5 62.5 0 
tronics 
Household dur- 0.36 15 78.95 1.25 18 94.74 0.67 5 100.00 3.00 6 75.00 
ables 
Clothing 0.14 8 42.11 3.00 12 63.16 1.00 2 40.00 1.67 4 50.00 
Children 's educa- 0.30 15 78.95 1.71 19 100.00 0.11 5 100.00 0.20 6 75.00 
tion 
Savings & invest- 0.58 15 78.95 3.00 18 94.74 1.00 5 100.00 11.00 6 75.00 
ment 
Marital & self-
related decisions 
How to raise 0.58 15 78.95 1.77 18 94.74 1.67 4 80.00 1.33 7 87.50 
children 
Birth control 4.00 5 26.32 7.00 8 42.11 Women 20.00 7.00 4 50.00 
only 
Woman's associa- 0.89 18 94.74 1.92 19 100.00 Women 5 100.00 0.75 7 87 .50 
lion only 
When to have sex 0.13 13 68.42 0.19 16 84.21 0.25 5 100.00 0.11 5 62.50 
Who has the "last 
Word" and Who 
should have 
Who has the last 0.06 18 94.74 0.23 19 100.00 0.00 5 l00.00 0.17 7 87 .50 
word on important 
family matters 
Who should have it 0.50 18 94.74 0.33 18 94.74 0.67 5 100.00 0.45 8 100.00 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
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Table 9. Women's influence in decision making and female level 
of contribution controlled by control of money in the doorkeeper group 
Major Contributors Equal Contributors 
Male N* Female N* Shared N* Male N* Female N* Shared N* 
Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Consumption & 
saving decisions 
Food 0.42 17 1.29 8 0.71 6 0.89 18 2.00 6 0.38 9 
Household 0.26 29 0.64 9 0.75 7 0.56 21 0.33 6 0.71 12 
electronics 
Household 0.61 29 0.64 9 1.33 7 1.33 21 0.33 6 1.00 12 
durables 
Clothing 1.55 28 3.50 9 1.00 7 1.38 19 1.40 6 1.40 12 
Children's 0.40 21 1.33 7 3.00 4 0.89 17 0.50 3 0.60 8 
education 
Savings & 0.33 26 1.33 7 0.75 7 0.82 20 0.71 6 0.29 11 
investment 
Marital & self-
related decisions 
How to raise 0.71 29 5.00 9 2.00 6 0.73 19 0.67 5 0.83 11 
children 
Birth control 1.83 17 1.67 4 3.00 4 2.20 8 n.a. 2 1.33 7 
Woman's asso- 2.22 29 5.00 9 0.56 7 1.21 21 1.40 6 1.67 12 
ciation 
When to have 0.19 25 0.64 9 0.27 7 0 .08 21 0.20 6 0.33 12 
sex 
The "last word" 
and who should 
Who has the last 0 .07 29 0.50 9 0.17 7 0.11 21 0.20 6 0.20 12 
word on impor-
tan t farnil y 
matters 
Who should have 0.49 29 0.50 9 0.75 7 0.45 21 1.40 6 0.71 12 
it 
Socio demo-
graphic charac-
teristics (Means) 
Age 33.3 29.0 26.9 32.4 28.0 26.8 
Age at marriage 17.7 17.0 17.l 17.9 17.5 17.4 
Years worked in 7.0 4.1 4 .5 7.9 6.8 5.2 
domestic service 
Duration in the 15.6 12.0 9.7 14.6 10.5 9.4 
city 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
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Table JO. Measures of the patriarchal authority and women's responses 
to patriarchy in the doorkeeper group 
N* Who has the Who should have 
Last Word? the Last Word ? 
PCT** who say PCT** who say 
"Men do" "Men should" 
Total of doorkeeper group 102 78.4 35.3 
Level of monetary contribution 
Major contributor 45 75.6 35.6 
Equal contributor 39 76.9 33.3 
Minor contributor 18 88.9 38.9 
Control of money 
Under male control 63 85.7 42.9 
Under female control 18 61.1 27.8 
Under shared control 21 71.4 19.0 
* N is the number of applicable responses to the item. 
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases. 
This cost might even mean facing physical male violence. It may explain 
why women like Zehra do not attempt to exercise such disposal rights 
more actively. Wife-beating is quite common in rural migrant families and 
studies demonstrate a close connection between domestic violence and 
money issues (Erman 1998). 
But Zehra's experience is also representative of the possibilities earn-
ing and claiming money open to women's subjectivities, it testifies to the 
salience of self-worth through economic agency and explains why women 
in this study are markedly critical of their husband's patriarchal authority. 
Only about a third of the women think that "Husbands should have the 
ultimate say". Women feel that familial authority should be based on the 
resources one contributes to the household rather than gender. They can-
not, however, directly demand more power or authority. 
When asked, "Who has the ultimate say in important family matters?" 
women, departing from previous responses pertaining to specific con-
sumption decisions, indicate that the husband has the final word. Over 
three fourths of the women, regardless of their level of contribution to 
household income, said that the ultimate word is their husbands'. It is 
possible that women achieve "equal participation" in a range of specific 
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household decisions while traditional male domination is maintained at 
structural levels. The overall decision-making score is not therefore a 
summary of other item-specific scores, but is instead a measure of "ideal-
ized authority" reflecting the husband's traditional institutionalized role. 
These husbands' traditional authority does not derive from their roles as 
providers (i.e. the resources they are capable of bringing in), but rather it 
emanates from their position in the traditional patriarchal family. 
Conclusion 
This present study reaffirms that the relationship between women's earn-
ings and claiming decision-making power are far from direct and simple. 
Women's monetary contribution to their households is not directly corre-
lated with independent control over money or with decision-making au-
thority in the household. The contrast between the doorkeeper wives and 
the squatter settlement women starkly demonstrates the irrelevance of the 
size of women's contribution to the household budget. Due to male con-
trol of money in doorkeeper households, the wives of doorkeepers are 
much higher contributors to household income than the squatter settle-
ment women, yet they claim less influence in decision making than the 
latter. This study identified a point of saturation: women's earnings en-
hance decision-making influence up to a point, as long as those earnings 
are subordinate or equal to the husbands' earnings. When women pass this 
point and begin to earn more than their husbands, husbands perceive this 
as a loss of their patriarchal power and compensate by exerting control 
over decision making. Decision-making profiles of the two groups of 
women are almost identical in the areas concerning the self, sex, and 
overall decision making and show similarities with other studies demon-
strating powerfully that non-economic decisions are resistant to challenge 
by women's income. Neither the size of earnings nor the control of it 
translates into women's autonomy. Yet, women's earnings and controlling 
money has generated a situation in which men's unquestioned authority as 
husbands has become less taken-for-granted and where women have 
started questioning naturalness of arbitrary male authority. 
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At a theoretical level, Turkish rural migrant women's experiences re-
veal the limitations of dichotomous frameworks: they obscure rather than 
illuminate the many ways that women embrace wage earning as the key to 
successful motherhood and good reputation as housewives while they 
simultaneously articulate the significance of financial independence/ 
autonomy within marriage for their sense of self worth and the way they 
express self-confidence. Women's definition of the self through the roles 
of wife and mother does not mean that they ignore the value of their labor 
in monetary terms or that the ideology of family unity or identity of inter-
ests destroys their sense of individuality. As this study showed, women 
have their own self-interests, often divergent from men and act on them 
with their earnings. They actively manage and attempt to increase their 
standing in the family and the community with their spending decisions. 
Their earnings offer a capacity to participate in an increasingly pervasive 
urban consumer culture and to invest into their children's education and 
upward mobility. This fusion of maternal altruism and self-interest in the 
definition of migrant women's identity underscores the need for concep-
tual frameworks that accommodate contradictions in women's lives. 
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